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Jack Alan Reynolds
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is the theory that there is only one fundamental kind, category of thing or principle; and, rather less commonly, with pluralism, which is the view that there are many kinds or categories. In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical — or mind and body or mind and brain — are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing. Because common sense tells us that there are physical bodies, and because there is intellectual pressure towards producing a unified view of the world, one could say that materialist monism is the ‘default option’. Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be treated as simply part of that world
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Olivier Sartenaer (2013). Neither Metaphysical Dichotomy nor Pure Identity. Clarifying the Emergentist Creed. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (3):365-373.
Jason Megill (2013). A Defense of Emergence. Axiomathes 23 (4):597-615.
Shashidhar Belbase (2013). A Unified Theory of Mind-Brain Relationship: Is It Possible? Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):443-450.
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