David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Metaphysica 9 (2):193-204 (2008)
How can an object remain the same, numerically identical, while undergoing change? This is a worry for endurantists, who hold that for any stages, x and y, of a persisting object, x is numerically identical with y. Endurantists might try to avoid the problem of change by insisting that all properties are temporally anchored. It is argued here that while this strategy helps in many cases, it does not help in all. A type of case is presented in which a property is time-indexed but the property is one that an object exemplifies at only one time in its career. The choice between the A theory and the B theory of time (in particular, presentism versus eternalism), and how that bears on the problem presented here, is also considered. It is argued that regardless of our views about the nature of time, so long as objects persist through time while undergoing change, the risk of violating the Indiscernibility of Identicals remains a serious threat to endurantism
|Keywords||A theory and B theory of time Change Endurantism Eternalism Identity Indiscernibility Perdurantism Persistence Presentism|
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References found in this work BETA
Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
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