David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol. 2. Oxford University Press (2012)
The simple model maintains that morally relevant factors combine in a simple, additive way, like weights on a scale. Although intuitive and familiar, this model entails that certain plausible views about particular cases and how morally relevant factors combine and interact therein are false. Shelly Kagan suggests that we could accommodate the relevant views and interactions by rejecting either of two assumptions the simple model makes: that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto (additivity); and that neither the “weight” nor the “valence” of a factor’s contribution can be affected by other factors (atomism). But is there an atomistic option, a way of accommodating the relevant views and interactions by rejecting additivity rather than atomism? I argue that developing an atomistic option requires offering a conception of contribution that renders coherent the particular claims that must be true if there is, indeed, such an option. And I consider whether Rossian pluralism—the locus classicus for the idea of a contributory right-making factor—offers the resources necessary to offer such a conception, and whether it could accommodate the relevant views and interactions other than by rejecting atomism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ralph Abraham & Sisir Roy (2012). The Atomistic Revival. World Futures 68 (1):30 - 39.
Eric Margolis (1998). How to Acquire a Concept. Mind and Language 13 (3):347-369.
David Alm (2004). Atomism About Value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):312 – 331.
Cei Maslen (2013). Keeping Score for Causal Claims: Causal Contextualism Applied to a Medical Case. Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (1):12-24.
Jon Mahoney (2004). Public Reason and the Moral Foundation of Liberalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (3):311-331.
Timothy Chappell (2001). Option Ranges. Journal of Applied Philosophy 18 (2):107–118.
J.-C. Poggiale, P. Auger, D. Nérini, C. Manté & F. Gilbert (2005). Global Production Increased by Spatial Heterogeneity in a Population Dynamics Model. Acta Biotheoretica 53 (4):359-370.
Jani Hakkarainen (2011). Hume's Argument for the Ontological Independence of Simple Properties. Metaphysica 12 (2):197-212.
Pierre Poirier (2005). Atomistic Learning in Non-Modular Systems. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):313-325.
Nancy Cartwright (2009). If No Capacities Then No Credible Worlds. But Can Models Reveal Capacities? Erkenntnis 70 (1):45 - 58.
Aki Lehtinen & Jaakko Kuorikoski (2007). Unrealistic Assumptions in Rational Choice Theory. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (2):115-138.
Joshua Allen Smith (2008). Relevant Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):55-71.
B. C. Postow (2007). Toward Honest Ethical Pluralism. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):191 - 210.
Jonathan Waskan (2008). Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions Through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):259 – 275.
Added to index2011-12-20
Total downloads35 ( #110,113 of 1,789,938 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #75,461 of 1,789,938 )
How can I increase my downloads?