David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):547-558 (2012)
Are the following propositions true of the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color all over at the same time (Incompatibility); the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism); and most human observers usually perceive the colors of objects veridically in typical conditions (Veridicality)? One reason to think not is that the empirical literature appears to support the proposition that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects amongst human observers in typical conditions (P-Disagreement). In this article, we defend Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality by calling into question whether the empirical literature really supports P-Disagreement.
|Keywords||Color Veridical Perception Objectivism Perceptual Disagreement|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brent Berlin & Paul Kay (1999). Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
Fiona Macpherson (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
David J. Chalmers (2006). Perception and the Fall From Eden. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 49--125.
Citations of this work BETA
Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (2015). Color Matching and Color Naming: A Reply to Kuehni and Hardin. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):207-212.
R. G. Kuehni & C. L. Hardin (2015). Color Matching and Color Naming: A Response to Roberts and Schmidtke. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):199-205.
Similar books and articles
Edward Wilson Averill & Allan Hazlett (2011). Color Objectivism and Color Projectivism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):751 - 765.
James A. McGilvray (1994). Constant Colors in the Head. Synthese 100 (2):197-239.
Vivian Mizrahi (2006). Color Objectivism and Color Pluralism. Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.
P. Ross (2000). The Relativity of Color. Synthese 123 (1):105-130.
Austen Clark (1996). True Theories, False Colors. Philosophy of Science (Supplement) 63 (3):143-50.
Don Dedrick (1995). Objectivism and the Evolutionary Value of Color Vision. Dialogue 34 (1):35-44.
Dimitria Electra Gatzia (2010). The Individual Variability Problem. Philosophia 38 (3):533-554.
John Campbell (2005). Transparency Vs. Revelation in Color Perception. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
Dejan Todorovic (2003). Color Realism and Color Illusions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):49-50.
Vivian Mizrahi (2010). Color and Transparency. Rivista di Estetica 43 (1):181-192.
Peter W. Ross (2012). Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138.
Gunnar Björnsson (2012). Do 'Objectivist' Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism? Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
Added to index2012-10-06
Total downloads198 ( #14,711 of 1,793,064 )
Recent downloads (6 months)48 ( #18,366 of 1,793,064 )
How can I increase my downloads?