David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 47 (3):285-309 (1998)
Gilbert Harman (1990) seeks to defend psychophysical functionalism by articulating a representationalist view of the qualities of experience. The negative side of the present paper argues that the resources of this representationalist view are insufficient to ground the evident distinction between perception and (mere) thought. This failure makes the view unable to support the uses to which Harman wishes to put it. Several rescuing moves by other representationalists are considered, but none is found successful. Part of the difficulty in Harman's (...) work is that he does not adequately specify the view he rejects. The positive aim of the present paper is to provide a robust intrinsic quality account of experience that offers advantages in comparison with Harman's view, and that plainly does not fall to any of the arguments he advances
|Keywords||Experience Functionalism Intrinsic Metaphysics Perception Quality Representationalism Thought Harman, G|
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Amy Kind (2010). Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):902-913.
Robert Schroer (2012). Representationalism and the Scene-Immediacy of Visual Experience: A Journey to the Fringe and Back. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):595 - 615.
Robert Schroer (2004). Environmental Representationalists on Afterimages and Phosphenes: Putting Our Best Foot Forward. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):531-546.
Robert Schroer (2007). Reticence of Visual Phenomenal Character: A Spatial Interpretation of Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):393-414.
Max Deutsch (2005). Intentionalism and Intransitivity. Synthese 144 (1):1-22.
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