Philosophical Studies 111 (3):277-293 (2002)
|Abstract||Frank Jackson has abandoned his famous knowledge argument, and has explained why in a brief "Postscript on Qualia" (1998). This explanation consists of a direct argument, and an attempt to explain away the intuition that lies at the heart of the knowledge argument. The direct argument is clarified and found to be subtly question-begging. The attempt to explain away the key intuition is reviewed and found to be inadequate. False memory traces, which Jackson mentions at the beginning of the direct argument, are discussed and found not to materially affect the force of the knowledge argument|
|Keywords||Knowledge Metaphysics Mind Qualia Jackson, F|
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