Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):85-100 (2006)
|Abstract||This paper begins with a summary of an argument for epiphenomenalism and a review of the author's previous work on the self-stultification objection to that view. The heart of the paper considers an objection to this previous work and provides a new response to it. Questions for this new response are considered and a view is developed in which knowledge of our own mentality is seen to differ from our knowledge of external things|
|Keywords||Belief Epiphenomenalism Epistemology Externalism Knowledge Self-deception Self-stultification|
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