Knowing me, knowing you: Theory of mind and the machinery of introspection

In Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (eds.), Trusting the Subject? The Use of Introspective Evidence in Cognitive Science Volume 2. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 129-143 (2004)
Abstract
Does the ability to know one's own mind depend on the ability to know the minds of others? According to the 'theory theory' of first-person mentalizing, the answer is yes. Recent alternative accounts of this ability, such as the 'monitoring theory', suggest otherwise. Focusing on the issue of introspective access to propositional attitudes , I argue that a better account of first-person mentalizing can be devised by combining these two theories. After sketching a hybrid account, I show how it can do justice to competing intuitions about the nature of introspective self-awareness. I close by drawing some methodological morals about the study of mentalizing and the role of introspective evidence in cognitive science
Keywords Introspection  Knowing  Mind
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