David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Economics and Philosophy 1 (2):213-229 (1985)
Ever since its first publication in 1970, Amartya Sen's paper “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” has served as the starting point for almost all discussions of liberty in social choice theory. However, a number of people, myself included, have argued that Sen's theorem rests on a misleading characterization of liberty . In a recent paper, addressed to a philosophical audience, Sen has provided a careful defence of his theorem against this charge. I shall argue that this defence does not work
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books.
John Stuart Mill & John M. Robson (1966). Principles of Political Economy. Philosophy 41 (158):365-367.
Amartya Sen (1983). Liberty and Social Choice. Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):5-28.
Peter Gardenfors (1981). Rights, Games and Social Choice. Noûs 15 (3):341-356.
Isaac Levi (1982). Liberty and Welfare. In Amartya Kumar Sen & Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press
Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Pressler (1987). Rights and Social Choice: Is There a Paretian Libertarian Paradox? Economics and Philosophy 3 (1):1.
Jonathan Riley (1989). Rights to Liberty in Purely Private Matters. Economics and Philosophy 5 (2):121.
S. Subramanian (1994). A Paretian Liberal Dilemma Without Collective Rationality. Theory and Decision 37 (3):323-332.
Herrade Igersheim (2013). Invoking a Cartesian Product Structure on Social States. Theory and Decision 74 (4):463-477.
Jonathan Riley (1990). Rights to Liberty in Purely Private Matters: Part II. Economics and Philosophy 6 (1):27.
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