Modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples and flickers of freedom

Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194 (2012)
Abstract
A great deal of attention has been paid recently to the claim that traditional Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which depend for their success on the presence of a perfectly reliable indicator (or prior sign ) of what an agent will freely do if left to act on his own, are guilty of begging the question against incompatibilists, since such indicators seem to presuppose a deterministic relation between an agent’s free action and its causal antecedents. Objections of this sort have given rise to considerable efforts to construct alternative Frankfurt-type counterexamples that do not rely on prior signs of this kind and so do not presuppose determinism in a way that incompatibilists should find objectionable. One consequence of this shift in the way Frankfurt-type counterexamples are formulated is that it provides an opportunity for the forceful resurgence of certain versions of the so-called flicker defense of PAP. In this paper I develop two versions of the flicker defense, indicate their advantages over other versions of this strategy, and defend them against objections. Insofar as either of these is successful, it will show not only that PAP has yet to be falsified by any of the modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples currently on offer but that cases of this sort are in principle incapable of falsifying PAP
Keywords Moral responsibility  Alternative possibilities  PAP  Frankfurt  Frankfurt-type counterexamples  Flickers of freedom  Robust
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,826
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 19 references

Citations of this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (2013). Libertarianism and Human Agency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):72-92.
Similar books and articles
David P. Hunt (1996). Frankfurt Counterexamples. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):395-401.
Justin A. Capes (2010). The W-Defense. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):61-77.
David Palmer (2011). Pereboom on the Frankfurt Cases. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-11-18

Total downloads

64 ( #25,059 of 1,100,145 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #40,727 of 1,100,145 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.