David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):762-788 (2004)
A common approach to explaining the perception of form is through the use of static features. The weakness of this approach points naturally to dynamic definitions of form. Considering dynamical form, however, leads inevitably to the need to explain how events are perceived as time-extended—a problem with primacy over that even of qualia. Optic flow models, energy models, models reliant on a rigidity constraint are examined. The reliance of these models on the instantaneous specification of form at an instant, t, or across a series of such instants forces the consideration of the primary memory supporting both the perception of time-extended events and the time-extension of consciousness. This cannot be reduced to an integration over space and time. The difficulty of defining the basis for this memory is highlighted in considerations of dynamic form in relation to scales of time. Ultimately, the possibility is raised that psychology must follow physics in a more profound approach to time and motion
|Keywords||*Form and Shape Perception *Memory *Time Models Motion Perception|
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Citations of this work BETA
Cameron Buckner (2015). Functional Kinds: A Skeptical Look. Synthese 192 (12):3915-3942.
Stephen E. Robbins (2006). Bergson and the Holographic Theory of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):365-394.
Stephen E. Robbins (2008). Semantic Redintegration: Ecological Invariance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):726-727.
Stephen E. Robbins (2009). The Cost of Explicit Memory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):33-66.
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