Paraconsistent logics included in Lewis’ S4

Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (03):442-466 (2010)
Abstract
As is known, a logic S is paraconsistent if the rule ECQ (E contradictione quodlibet) is not a rule of S. Not less well known is the fact that Lewis’ modal logics are not paraconsistent. Actually, Lewis vindicates the validity of ECQ in a famous proof currently known as the “Lewis’ proof” or “Lewis’ argument.” This proof essentially leans on the Disjunctive Syllogism as a rule of inference. The aim of this paper is to define a series of paraconsistent logics included in S4 where the Disjunctive Syllogism is valid only as a rule of proof.
Keywords Paraconsistent logics  Disjunctive syllogism
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References found in this work BETA
Ian Hacking (1963). What is Strict Implication? Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (1):51-71.
Clarence Irving Lewis (1959). Symbolic Logic. [New York]Dover Publications.

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