Time, form and the limits of qualia

Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (1):19-43 (2007)
Abstract
Our understanding of qualia is extremely weak when considerations of time are brought into play. Ignored has been the fact that the scale of time imposed by the brain on the events of the matter-field already defines quality, and that there is an essential “primary memory” or continuity of time that underlies all qualitative events. This weakness is magnified when the concept of qualia is applied to form. The origin of the dilemma lies in the fact that the problem of qualia is posed in the context of an abstract space and time. When the time-evolution of the matter-field is taken as indivisible or non-differentiable, the problem can be reposed. It becomes a problem of the optimal specification of properties of an already qualitative matter-field at a particular scale of time
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Stephen E. Robbins (2009). The Cost of Explicit Memory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):33-66.
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