David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):14-25 (1996)
This paper offers an account of why the Hard Problem cannot be solved within our present conceptual framework. The reason is that some property of each conscious experience lacks structure, while explanations of the kind that would overcome the Hard Problem require structure in the occurrences that are to be explained. This account is apt to seem incorrect for reasons that trace to relational theories of consciousness. I thus review a highly developed representative version of relational theory and explain why I do not find it acceptable. This rejection requires a nonrelational alternative, which I describe and defend against a certain further objection. Finally, I discuss implications of the foregoing for the views of McGinn and Chalmers
|Keywords||Consciousness Event Neural Science Chalmers, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Uriah Kriegel (2004). The New Mysterianism and the Thesis of Cognitive Closure. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):177-191.
Similar books and articles
David John Chalmers (2010). The Character of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Dan Zahavi (2003). Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):63-92.
Jonathan Shear (1996). The Hard Problem: Closing the Empirical Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):54-68.
Gregg H. Rosenberg (1996). Rethinking Nature: A Hard Problem Within the Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):76-88.
Benjamin W. Libet (1996). Solutions to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):33-35.
Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):4-6.
Piotr Boltuc (2009). The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):155-176.
Eugene O. Mills (1996). Giving Up on the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):26-32.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads39 ( #69,387 of 1,700,240 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #88,892 of 1,700,240 )
How can I increase my downloads?