David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):14-25 (1996)
This paper offers an account of why the Hard Problem cannot be solved within our present conceptual framework. The reason is that some property of each conscious experience lacks structure, while explanations of the kind that would overcome the Hard Problem require structure in the occurrences that are to be explained. This account is apt to seem incorrect for reasons that trace to relational theories of consciousness. I thus review a highly developed representative version of relational theory and explain why I do not find it acceptable. This rejection requires a nonrelational alternative, which I describe and defend against a certain further objection. Finally, I discuss implications of the foregoing for the views of McGinn and Chalmers
|Keywords||Consciousness Event Neural Science Chalmers, D|
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Torin Alter (2015). The Structure and Dynamics Argument Against Materialism. Noûs 50 (2):n/a-n/a.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). The New Mysterianism and the Thesis of Cognitive Closure. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):177-191.
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