David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Utilitas 19 (3):267-311 (2007)
The non-identity problem is really a collection of problems having distinct logical features. For that reason, non-identity problems can be typed. This article focuses on just one type of non-identity problem, the problem, which includes Derek Parfit's depletion example and many others. The can't-expect-better problem uses an assessment about the low probability of any particular person's coming into existence to reason that an earlier wrong act does not harm that person. This article argues that that line of reasoning is unusually treacherous in that it makes not just one hard-to-detect error in what is done with the relevant probability assessments but rather alternates between two. We sort out one fallacy only to fall, against all odds (as it were), into a second. By avoiding both errors, we become able to discern harm in cases in which the can't-expect-better problem argues there is none. We will then be in a position to set aside the can't-expect-better problem as an objection against the person-based intuition that acts that are must be at least some existing or future person
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Melinda A. Roberts (2011). The Asymmetry: A Solution. Theoria 77 (4):333-367.
Mark E. Greene (2016). Roberts on Depletion: How Much Better Can We Do for Future People? Utilitas 28 (1):108-118.
Ramon Das (2014). Has Industrialization Benefited No One? Climate Change and the Non-Identity Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):747-759.
Melinda A. Roberts (2011). An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):765-776.
Nicholas Vrousalis (2013). Smuggled Into Existence: Nonconsequentialism, Procreation, and Wrongful Disability. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):589-604.
Similar books and articles
Quassim Cassam (1993). Parfit on Persons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:17-37.
Bryan G. Norton (1982). Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future Generations. Environmental Ethics 4 (4):319-337.
James Baillie (1996). Identity, Relation R, and What Matters: A Challenge to Derek Parfit. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):263-267.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1989). Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (2):103-31.
Tove Finnestad (2001). Trivial Personal Differences. Philosophical Papers 30 (1):41-55.
Lloyd Fields (1987). Parfit on Personal Identity and Desert. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (October):432-41.
Geoffrey C. Madell (1985). Derek Parfit and Greta Garbo. Analysis 45 (March):105-9.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Parfit on What Matters in Survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads59 ( #76,084 of 1,934,423 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #58,780 of 1,934,423 )
How can I increase my downloads?