David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94 (1997)
Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used in different senses in the principles. In (1) and (3), 'properties' should be read as 'tropes' (properties here are particulars), while in (2) 'properties' should read as 'types' (properties here are universals or classes). Although mental types are distinct from physical types, every mental trope is a physical trope. This allows mental properties to be causally relevant to physical effects without violating the closed character of the physical world.
|Keywords||Causation Epiphenomenalism Epistemology Mental Property|
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1989). Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press.
David M. Braun (1995). Causally Relevant Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 9:447-75.
Keith Campbell (1990). Abstract Particulars. B. Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Hilan Bensusan & Eros de Carvalho (2011). Qualia Qua Qualitons: Mental Qualities as Abstract Particulars. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 26 (2):155-163.
Bence Nanay (2012). Perceiving Tropes. Erkenntnis 77 (1):1-14.
Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
Eric Marcus (2005). Mental Causation in a Physical World. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
Jack C. Lyons (2006). In Defense of Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.
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