The properties of mental causation

Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used in different senses in the principles. In (1) and (3), 'properties' should be read as 'tropes' (properties here are particulars), while in (2) 'properties' should read as 'types' (properties here are universals or classes). Although mental types are distinct from physical types, every mental trope is a physical trope. This allows mental properties to be causally relevant to physical effects without violating the closed character of the physical world.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Emergence and causal powers.Graham Macdonald - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):239 - 253.
Mind-body causation and explanatory practice.Tyler Burge - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
The problem of mental causation and the nature of properties.S. C. Gibb - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):464-75.
Physicalism and the problem of mental causation.Robert Buckley - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
263 (#69,577)

6 months
21 (#100,442)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Robb
Davidson College

Citations of this work

Non-reductive realization and the powers-based subset strategy.Jessica Wilson - 2011 - The Monist (Issue on Powers) 94 (1):121-154.
Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Emergent Properties.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 53 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

What is a Law of Nature?D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Sydney Shoemaker.
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

View all 36 references / Add more references