Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 127 (1):59-85 (2006)
|Abstract||Cognitive science is shamelessly materialistic. It maintains that human beings are nothing more than complex physical systems, ultimately and completely explicable in mechanistic terms. But this conception of humanity does not ?t well with common sense. To think of the creatures we spend much of our day loving, hating, admiring, resenting, comparing ourselves to, trying to understand, blaming, and thanking -- to think of them as mere mechanisms seems at best counterintuitive and unhelpful. More often it may strike us as ludicrous, or even abhorrent. We are|
|Keywords||Cognitive Science Consciousness Intentionality Metaphysics Phenomena Stance|
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