The phenomenal stance

Philosophical Studies 127 (1):59-85 (2006)
Abstract
Cognitive science is shamelessly materialistic. It maintains that human beings are nothing more than complex physical systems, ultimately and completely explicable in mechanistic terms. But this conception of humanity does not ?t well with common sense. To think of the creatures we spend much of our day loving, hating, admiring, resenting, comparing ourselves to, trying to understand, blaming, and thanking -- to think of them as mere mechanisms seems at best counterintuitive and unhelpful. More often it may strike us as ludicrous, or even abhorrent. We are
Keywords Cognitive Science  Consciousness  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Stance
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1973). Mechanism and Responsibility. In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 157--84.

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Citations of this work BETA
Wayne Wright (2007). Explanation and the Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301 - 330.
Adam Arico (2010). Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):371-393.

View all 16 citations

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