David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 12 (1):37 - 53 (1978)
Two theories of representation are then developed, A fregean and a kripkean. According to the fregean theory, What a picture represents is a function of its "sense," whereas according to the kripkean theory, What a picture represents is a function of its "history." the concepts of "sense" and "history" are spelt out in some detail. Both theories are shown to be plausible theories of representation although there are difficulties with both. In particular, Neither theory seems capable of explaining "metaphorical" cases of representation-As
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