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David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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William S. Robinson has for many years written insightfully about the mind-body problem. In Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness he focuses on sensory experience (eg, pain, afterimages) and perception qualities such as colors, sounds and odors to present a dualistic view of the mind, called Qualitative Event Realism, that goes against the dominant materialist views. This theory is relevant to the development of a science of consciousness which is now being pursued not only by philosophers but by researchers in psychology and the brain sciences. This provocative book will interest students and professionals who work in the philosophy of mind and will also have cross-disciplinary appeal in cognitive psychology and the brain sciences
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William G. Lycan (2013). Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
Dean Zimmerman (2010). From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119 - 150.
Ian Phillips (2013). Afterimages and Sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.
Dimitris Platchias (2009). Representationalism, Symmetrical Supervenience and Identity. Philosophia 37 (1):31-46.
William S. Robinson (2013). Experiencing is Not Observing: A Response to Dwayne Moore on Epiphenomenalism and Self-Stultification. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):185-192.
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