Undermining undermined: Why Humean supervenience never needed to be debugged (even if it's a necessary truth)
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S98- (2001)
The existence of "undermining futures" appears to show that a contradiction can be deduced from the conjunction of Humean supervenience (HS) about chance and the Principal Principle. A number of strategies for rescuing HS from this problem have been proposed recently. In this paper, a novel way of defending HS from the threat is presented, and it is argued that this defense has advantages not shared by others. In particular, it requires no revisionism about chance, and it is equally available to defenders of HS who hold HS to be necessary and those who hold it to be contingent
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Citations of this work BETA
Rachael Briggs (forthcoming). Foundations of Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-16.
Rachael Briggs (2009). The Anatomy of the Big Bad Bug. Noûs 43 (3):428-449.
Kevin Nelson (2009). On Background: Using Two-Argument Chance. Synthese 166 (1):165 - 186.
Peter B. M. Vranas (2004). Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Old Principal Principle Reconciled with the New. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368–382.
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