Graduate studies at Western
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):83-101 (2009)
|Abstract||The problem of vagueness and the sorites paradox arise because we try to treat natural language as if it were a unitary formal system. In fact, natural language contains a large variety of representational ontologies that serve different purposes and which cannot be united formally, but which can intuitively be taken as ways of seeing a common basic ontology. Using this framework, we can save classical logic from vagueness and avoid the sorites.|
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