Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge

Noûs 45 (1):22-49 (2011)
The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.
Keywords Conceivability  De Re Modality
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00757.x
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