Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge

Noûs 45 (1):22-49 (2011)
Abstract The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge
Keywords Conceivability  De Re Modality
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,701
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    David J. Chalmers (2002). Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
    Gideon Rosen (2002). A Study in Modal Deviance. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
    Peter Menzies (1998). Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their Connections. In Roberto Casati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
    George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
    Stephen Cade Hetherington (1991). Conceivability and Modal Knowledge. In Tamara Horowitz (ed.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Rowman and Littlefield.
    M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):364-380.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-06-24

    Total downloads

    131 ( #3,486 of 549,108 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    16 ( #3,908 of 549,108 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums