David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 75 (1):61-65 (2011)
In this paper I articulate a fictionalist solution to the closure problem that affects constructive empiricism. Relying on Stephen Yablo’s recent study of closure puzzles, I show how we can partition the content of a theory in terms of its truthmakers and claim that a constructive empiricist can believe that all the observable conditions that are necessary to make a part of her theory true obtain and remain agnostic about whether or not the other truthmakers for the other parts of her theory obtain. This can be done even though she asserts her theory as if it was wholly true
|Keywords||Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Ontology Logic Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
Harold I. Brown (1977). Perception, Theory, and Commitment: The New Philosophy of Science. Precedent Pub..
Peter Lipton (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation. Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
F. A. Muller (2004). Can a Constructive Empiricist Adopt the Concept of Observability? Philosophy of Science 71 (1):80-97.
Bas C. Van Fraassen (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press.
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