Two spheres, twenty spheres, and the identity of indiscernibles

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):480–492 (2005)
I argue that the standard counterexamples to the identity of indiscernibles fail because they involve a commitment to a certain kind of primitive or brute identity that has certain very unpalatable consequences involving the possibility of objects of the same kind completely overlapping and sharing all the same proper parts. The only way to avoid these consequences is to reject brute identity and thus to accept the identity of indiscernibles. I also show how the rejection of the identity of indiscernibles derives some of its support from its affinity with a Kripkean account of trans-world identity and theories of direct reference.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00238.x
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