(C) instances, the relevance criterion, and the paradoxes of confirmation

Philosophy of Science 45 (2):289-302 (1978)
The Relevance Criterion of confirmation gained prominence as the underlying principle of the class-size approach (CSA) to Hempel's paradoxes of confirmation. The CSA, however, yields counter-intuitive results for (c) instances, and this failing cast serious doubt on the acceptability of the Relevance Criterion. In this paper an attempt is made to rescue the Relevance Criterion from this embarrassment. This is done by incorporating that criterion into a new resolution of the paradoxes, a resolution based on a theory of selective confirmation and a distinction between mere confirmation in principle and evaluative confirmation (E-confirmation)
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DOI 10.1086/288801
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Robert T. Pennock (2004). Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-26.

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