EI impacto de Wittgenstein sobre Russell

Theoria 7 (1-2):875-911 (1992)
Abstract
In this article I propose a new explanation of the relationship between Russell and ther first Wittgenstein. There are five main novelties in my interpretation; (i) the use of all relevant unpublished manuscripts of Russell; (ii) the discovery of the first apparition of the “multiple theory of judgment” in a purely logical and unpublished context; (iii) the role of the Bradleian objection against relations in the evolution of the nation of form in both Russell and Wittgenstein; (iv) a general point of view to obtain a common explanation of all the criticisms of Wittgenstein against Russell and of the abandonment to Theory of Knowledge; and (v) the first account of the contribution of Whitehead to the progressive Russellian evolution from atomism to holism
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Ian Proops (2004). Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
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