From shared agency to the normativity of law: Shapiro's and Coleman's defence of Hart's practice theory of rules reconsidered
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Law and Philosophy 28 (1):59 - 100 (2009)
Colemanand Shapiro have recently advanced a second at- tempt to reconcile Hart’s practice theory of rules and the idea of the normativity of law; i.e., the idea that legal rules qua social rules give reasons for actions and, in some circumstances create and impose duties and obligations. Their argumentative strategy is to resort to elements in Bratman’s work on shared agency and planning, though they introduce important and substantive modiﬁcations to Bratman’s own explanation. Bratman describes his own theory as a modest theory of the will where the notion of planning plays a fundamental role. Both Shapiro’s and Coleman’s application of Bratman’s planning theory of agency to an authority structure such as law is impressive, but a number of objections can be levelled, with the intention of grasping both the nature of authority structures and the normativity of law. Although I have referred to Shapiro’s and Coleman’s applica- tions as being similar to one another, the diﬀerences are sub- stantive and important. I will scrutinise both Shapiro’s and Coleman’s explanations of ‘shared agency’ and discuss the objections that can be raised against each application.
|Keywords||Legal Philosophy Shared agency Intentional action|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Mark J. Bennett (2011). Hart and Raz on the Non-Instrumental Moral Value of the Rule of Law: A Reconsideration. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 30 (5):603-635.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Framing Joint Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
Steve Matthews (2004). Failed Agency and the Insanity Defence. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27:413-424.
Scott J. Shapiro (2007). The "Hart-Dworkin" Debate : A Short Guide for the Perplexed. In Arthur Ripstein (ed.), Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge University Press 22--49.
Jules L. Coleman (ed.) (2001). Hart's Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law. Oxford University Press.
F. Atria (1999). Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):537-577.
Jules L. Coleman (2001). The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. Oxford University Press.
E. N. G. Svein (2011). Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Exchanges Between Hart and Ross. Ratio Juris 24 (2):194-246.
Wilfrid J. Waluchow (1985). Hart, Legal Rules and Palm Tree Justice. Law and Philosophy 4 (1):41 - 70.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #80,950 of 1,796,226 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #208,698 of 1,796,226 )
How can I increase my downloads?