David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Legal Theory 16 (1):59-76 (2010)
This article focuses primarily on the emotion of guilt as providing a justification for retributive legal punishment. In particular, I challenge the claim according to which guilt can function as part of our epistemic justification of positive retributivism, that is, the view that wrongdoing is both necessary and sufficient to justify punishment. I show that the argument to this conclusion rests on two premises: (1) to feel guilty typically involves the judgment that one deserves punishment; and (2) those who feel guilty after wrongdoing are more virtuous (or less vicious) than those who do not. I shall argue that premise (1) is false on both empirical and conceptual grounds and that there are no particularly good grounds supporting this premise (2). Finally, I consider and reject the claim that anger, as opposed to guilt, can afford the type of epistemic justification needed by positive retributivism.
|Keywords||Guilt, Anger, Emotion, Criminal Law, Punishment, Retribution|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Nico H. Frijda (1986). The Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ”Appropriateness' of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65--90.
Sigmund Freud (1972). Civilization and its Discontents. In John Martin Rich (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Education. Belmont, Calif.,Wadsworth Pub. Co.
Antony Duff (2003). Punishment, Communication and Community. In Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike (eds.), Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Routledge, in Association with the Open University
Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (2000). The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):65-90.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Thom Brooks (2003). Kant's Theory of Punishment. Utilitas 15 (2):206.
Raffaele Rodogno (2009). Shame, Guilt, and Punishment. Law and Philosophy 28 (5):429 - 464.
Brian Rosebury (2011). Moore's Moral Facts and the Gap in the Retributive Theory. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):361-376.
J. Angelo Corlett (2001). Making Sense of Retributivism. Philosophy 76 (1):77-110.
Michael Potegal (2005). Characteristics of Anger: Notes for a Systems Theory of Emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):215-216.
Christopher Ciocchetti (2009). Emotions, Retribution, and Punishment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):160-173.
Roger Wertheimer (1983). Understanding Retribution. Criminal Justice Ethics 2 (2):19-38.
George Schedler (2011). Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment. Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (3):240-266.
Michael Cholbi (2010). Compulsory Victim Restitution is Punishment: A Reply to Boonin. Public Reason 2 (1):85-93.
Michael Clark (2006). Retribution and Organic Unities. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (3):351-358.
Katrina Sifferd (2012). Changing the Criminal Character: Nanotechnology and Criminal Punishment. In A. Santosuosso (ed.), Proceedings of the 2011 Law and Science Young Scholars Symposium. Pavia University Press
Greg Roebuck & David Wood (2011). A Retributive Argument Against Punishment. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (1):73-86.
Nathan Hanna (2014). Retributivism Revisited. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):473-484.
Thaddeus Metz (2000). Censure Theory and Intuitions About Punishment. Law and Philosophy 19 (4):491-512.
Douglas Lind (1994). Kant on Criminal Punishment. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:61-74.
Added to index2010-11-15
Total downloads51 ( #79,214 of 1,789,926 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #317,270 of 1,789,926 )
How can I increase my downloads?