Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his Correspondence with Clarke

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):429 – 438 (1999)
Abstract
In Section 21 of his fifth letter to Clarke Leibniz attempts to derive the Identity of Indiscernibles from an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to God´s act of creation, namely that God has a reason to create the world he creates. In this paper I argue that this argument fails, not just because the Identity of Indiscernibles is false, but because there is a counterexample to one of the premises that Leibniz cannot satisfactorily rule out.
Keywords Leibniz  Identity of Indiscernibles  Sufficient Reson
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Ori Belkind (2013). Leibniz and Newton on Space. Foundations of Science 18 (3):467-497.
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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz & Samuel Clarke (2007). The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell Pub. Ltd..
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