Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his Correspondence with Clarke

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):429 – 438 (1999)
In Section 21 of his fifth letter to Clarke Leibniz attempts to derive the Identity of Indiscernibles from an application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason to God´s act of creation, namely that God has a reason to create the world he creates. In this paper I argue that this argument fails, not just because the Identity of Indiscernibles is false, but because there is a counterexample to one of the premises that Leibniz cannot satisfactorily rule out.
Keywords Leibniz  Identity of Indiscernibles  Sufficient Reson
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DOI 10.1080/00048409912349201
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References found in this work BETA
Steven French & Michael Redhead (1988). Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):233-246.

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Ori Belkind (2013). Leibniz and Newton on Space. Foundations of Science 18 (3):467-497.

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Similar books and articles
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz & Samuel Clarke (2007). The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell Pub. Ltd.

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