Mellor's facts and chances of causation

Analysis 58 (3):175–181 (1998)
Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of causation.
Keywords D. H. Mellor  Causation  Facts  Slingshot  Chances
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00119
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Mellor's facts and chances of causation
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

142 ( #27,417 of 1,911,837 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

42 ( #15,492 of 1,911,837 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.