Analysis 58 (3):175–181 (1998)
|Abstract||Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as the relata of causation.|
|Keywords||D. H. Mellor Causation Facts Slingshot Chances|
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