Paradigms and Russell's resemblance regress
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):644 – 651 (2004)
| Abstract | Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed. | |||||||||
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D. M. Armstrong (2003). Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra's Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):285 – 286.
David Manley (2002). Properties and Resemblance Classes. Noûs 36 (1):75–96.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism. Oxford University Press.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2001). Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):395 – 408.
Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Clarendon Press.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford University Press.
James Cargile (2003). On Russell's Argument Against Resemblance Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):549 – 560.
Alexander Bird (2003). Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts. Analysis 63 (3):221–228.
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