Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community

The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman’s Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if ‘x resembles y’ is understood as ‘x and y share some property’. In the paper I explain and criticise several solutions to the difficulty. Then I develop my own solution, which is not subject to the objections I make to the other solutions, and which accords completely with the basic tenets of Resemblance Nominalism
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DOI 10.2307/2653564
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PhilPapers Archive Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community
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Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999). Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):965-982.
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