David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):161-175 (2003)
Strong Al presupposes (1) that Super-Searle (henceforth ‘Searle’) comes to know that the symbols he manipulates are meaningful , and (2) that there cannot be two or more semantical interpretations for the system of symbols that Searle manipulates such that the set of rules constitutes a language comprehension program for each interpretation. In this paper, I show that Strong Al is false and that presupposition #1 is false, on the assumption that presupposition #2 is true. The main argument of the paper constructs a second program, isomorphic to Searle’s, to show that if someone, say Dan, runs this isomorphic program, he cannot possibly come to know what its mentioned symbols mean because they do not mean anything to anybody. Since Dan and Searle do exactly the same thing, except that the symbols they manipulate are different, neither Dan nor Searle can possibly know whether the symbols they manipulate are meaningful (let alone what they mean, if they are meaningful). The remainder of the paper responds to an anticipated Strong Al rejoinder, which, I believe, is a necessary extension of Strong Al
|Keywords||Functionalism Language Meaning Semantics Searle, J|
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References found in this work BETA
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Ned Block (1980). What Intuitions About Homunculi Don't Show. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):425.
Douglas R. Hofstadter & Daniel C. Dennett (1981). Reflections. In D. R. Hofstadter & D. C. Dennett (eds.), The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul. New York, Basic Books
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