The Bundle Theory is compatible with distinct but indiscernible particulars

Analysis 64 (1):72–81 (2004)
According to a widely held philosophical opinion the Bundle Theory entails the Identity of Indiscernibles. In this paper I show that the Bundle Theory neither entails nor is otherwise committed to the Identity of Indiscernibles and therefore the Bundle Theory is compatible with the falsity of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I also show that the Bundle Theory can give an account of particulars consistent with the falsity of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Not only that, when developed in this way the Bundle Theory can be used to refute the Identity of Indiscernibles.
Keywords Bundle Theory  Identity of Indiscernibles
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    References found in this work BETA
    Ian Hacking (1975). The Identity of Indiscernibles. Journal of Philosophy 72 (9):249-256.

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