The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis

Philosophical Papers 31 (1):39-47 (2002)
In this paper I argue, contra Fraser MacBride, that conceptual analysis, and in particular the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, can solve the Problem of Universals, whether understood as the One over Many or the as the Many over One. In this paper I show why the solutions needed to solve either version of the problem must be in terms of truthmakers, and that the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is not sufficient to solve them.
Keywords Problem of Universals  Conceptual Analysis  Truthmakers
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