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Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2003)
In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness
|Keywords||Action Agent Behavior Knowledge Metaphysics Self-awareness|
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|Buy the book||$29.00 used (80% off) $32.89 new (78% off) $68.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD450.A39 2003|
|ISBN(s)||0199245614 0199245622 9780199245628|
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Douglas Frye & Philip David Zelazo, The Development of Young Children's Action Control and Awareness.
G. Humphreys & M. Jane Riddoch, Fractionating the Intentional Control of Behaviour: A Neuropsychological Analysis.
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Citations of this work BETA
John Schwenkler (2011). Perception and Practical Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.
Thor Grünbaum (2011). Perception and Non-Inferential Knowledge of Action. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167.
Jesús H. Aguilar (2012). Basic Causal Deviance, Action Repertoires, and Reliability. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):1-19.
Marc Slors (2013). Conscious Intending as Self-Programming. Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):94-113.
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