A particularist epistemology: 'Affectual intuitionism' [Book Review]
Graduate studies at Western
Acta Analytica 21 (1):33-44 (2006)
|Abstract||Jonathan Dancy has developed a very refined theory called ethical particularism. He has argued extensively for the metaphysical part of his position. However, the accompanying epistemology is not yet clear. In this paper I will sketch a particularist epistemology that is consistent with Dancy’s particularist metaphysics, although my approach differs in certain respects from epistemological claims Dancy has made. I will defend an epistemology that states: 1. that moral knowledge is based on intuitions and 2. that we need emotions in order to have moral knowledge. I will call this approach ‘affectual intuitionism’. Dancy rejects both claims, but I will argue that his arguments against these claims are not convincing.|
|Keywords||moral epistemology Jonathan Dancy particularism intuitions emotions|
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