A particularist epistemology: 'Affectual intuitionism' [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Acta Analytica 21 (1):33-44 (2006)
Jonathan Dancy has developed a very refined theory called ethical particularism. He has argued extensively for the metaphysical part of his position. However, the accompanying epistemology is not yet clear. In this paper I will sketch a particularist epistemology that is consistent with Dancy’s particularist metaphysics, although my approach differs in certain respects from epistemological claims Dancy has made. I will defend an epistemology that states: 1. that moral knowledge is based on intuitions and 2. that we need emotions in order to have moral knowledge. I will call this approach ‘affectual intuitionism’. Dancy rejects both claims, but I will argue that his arguments against these claims are not convincing.
|Keywords||moral epistemology Jonathan Dancy particularism intuitions emotions|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Reid (2002). Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Pennsylvania State University Press.
Martha C. Nussbaum (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (2004). Ethics Without Principles. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (1993). Moral Reasons. Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Sabine Roeser (2012). Emotional Engineers: Toward Morally Responsible Design. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):103-115.
Maike Albertzart (2013). Principle-Based Moral Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.
Attila Tanyi (2014). Pure Cognitivism and Beyond. Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.
Sabine Roeser (2009). Reid and Moral Emotions. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2):177-192.
Similar books and articles
Robert Audi (1998). Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
Nancy Salay (2008). Thinking Without Global Generalisations: A Cognitive Defence of Moral Particularism. Inquiry 51 (4):390 – 411.
Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Intuitive Non-Naturalism Meets Cosmic Coincidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.
Theo Van Willigenburg (1998). New Casuistry: What's New? Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):152 – 164.
Jonathan Dancy (1982). Intuitionism in Meta-Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 42 (3):395 - 408.
Karyn Gurney Toerien, Can We Be Particularists About Environmental Ethics? : Assessing the Theory of Moral Particularism and its Practical Application in Applied Environmental Ethics.
Benedict Smith (2006). Particularism, Perception and Judgement. Acta Analytica 21 (2):12-29.
Philipp Schwind (2006). A Critical Discussion of Jonathan Dancy's Moral Particularism. Dissertation, St. Andrews
Sean D. McKeever & Michael Ridge (2006). Particularism and the Contingent a Priori. Acta Analytica 21 (2):3-11.
C. Kirwin (2011). Why Sibley Is (Probably) Not a Particularist After All. British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (2):201-212.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads93 ( #43,803 of 1,849,453 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #346,486 of 1,849,453 )
How can I increase my downloads?