Thought insertion, self-awareness, and rationality

Abstract This chapter argues that recent attempts to make sense of the delusion of thought insertion in terms of a distinction between two notions of thought ownership have been unsuccessful. It also proposes an alternative account, on which the delusion is to be interpreted in the light of its prehistory
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    Christoph Hoerl (2001). On Thought Insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.
    George Graham (2004). Self-Ascription: Thought Insertion. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press.

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