In defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism

Utilitas 22 (2):198-221 (2010)
In this paper, I develop, motivate and offer a qualified defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism (SC). I develop the view primarily in light of objections to other versions of SC recently posed by Ben Bradley. I motivate the view by showing that it (1) accommodates the intuitions apparently supporting those objections, (2) is supported by certain ‘common sense’ moral intuitions about specific cases, and (3) captures the central ideas expressed by satisficing consequentialists in the recent literature. Finally, I offer a qualified defense of the view that consists in showing that it meets Bradley’s criteria for being a version of satisficing consequentialism that is ‘worth considering’. Specifically, it is a version of SC that solves certain problems for maximizing consequentialism and yet does not permit the gratuitous prevention of goodness.
Keywords satisficing  consequentialism  maximizing  Bradley  gratuitous prevention of goodness  ethics
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820810000099
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Hurka (1990). Two Kinds of Satisficing. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):107 - 111.
Tim Mulgan (2001). How Satisficers Get Away with Murder. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (1):41 – 46.

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