Utilitas 22 (2):198-221 (2010)
|Abstract||In this paper, I develop, motivate and offer a qualified defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism (SC). I develop the view primarily in light of objections to other versions of SC recently posed by Ben Bradley. I motivate the view by showing that it (1) accommodates the intuitions apparently supporting those objections, (2) is supported by certain ‘common sense’ moral intuitions about specific cases, and (3) captures the central ideas expressed by satisficing consequentialists in the recent literature. Finally, I offer a qualified defense of the view that consists in showing that it meets Bradley’s criteria for being a version of satisficing consequentialism that is ‘worth considering’. Specifically, it is a version of SC that solves certain problems for maximizing consequentialism and yet does not permit the gratuitous prevention of goodness.|
|Keywords||satisficing consequentialism maximizing Bradley gratuitous prevention of goodness ethics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Bart Streumer (2003). Can Consequentialism Cover Everything? Utilitas 15 (2):237-47.
Tim Mulgan (2001). How Satisficers Get Away with Murder. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (1):41 – 46.
Tim Mulgan (2006). SLOTE'S SATISFICING CONSEQUENTIALISM. Ratio 6 (2):121 - 134.
Ben Bradley (2005). Virtue Consequentialism. Utilitas 17 (3):282-298.
Edmund Henden (2007). Is Genuine Satisficing Rational? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):339 - 352.
Tim Mulgan (2001). The Demands of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
Barry Schwartz, Yakov Ben-Haim & Cliff Dacso (2011). What Makes a Good Decision? Robust Satisficing as a Normative Standard of Rational Decision Making. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 41 (2):209-227.
Ben Bradley (2006). Against Satisficing Consequentialism. Utilitas 18 (2):97-108.
Added to index2010-01-04
Total downloads74 ( #13,674 of 722,741 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,873 of 722,741 )
How can I increase my downloads?