Routes to triviality

Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):421-436 (2004)
It is known that a number of inference principles can be used to trivialise the axioms of naïve comprehension - the axioms underlying the naïve theory of sets. In this paper we systematise and extend these known results, to provide a number of general classes of axioms responsible for trivialising naïve comprehension
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.1023/B:LOGI.0000036853.44128.8f
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Susan Rogerson (2007). Natural Deduction and Curry's Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):155 - 179.

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