Online research in philosophy

There are two ways of dealing with Kant's derogatory position on music. Either it is claimed that Kant's opinion is a result of biographical factors, or Kant is regarded as a mere predecessor of a more successful music aesthetics. While the first way mistakes Kant's personal preferences for a philosophical argument about the nature of sound, the second approach underestimates the close connection between his music aesthetics and his whole philosophical system. Against these approaches the article defends the proposition that Kant's (like any other) music aesthetics can only be understood with reference to the concepts of „time“ and „movement“ in order to elucidate the ontology of sound objects.

Kant’s Critique of Judgment is one of the most important texts in the history of modern aesthetics. This GuideBook discusses the third Critique section by section, and introduces and assesses: Kant's life and the background of the Critique of Judgment the ideas and text of the Critique of Judgment , including a critical explanation of Kant’s theories of natural beauty The continuing relevance of Kant’s work to contemporary philosophy and aesthetics This GuideBook is an accessible introduction to a notoriously difficult work and will be essential reading for students of Kant and aesthetics.

Salim Kemal clarifies the nature of aesthetic judgements and their epistemological status, and examines the scope of Kant's justification of their validity.

In a well-known passage from the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Kant defines the power or faculty of judgment [Urteilskraft] as "the capacity to think the particular as contained under the universal" (Introduction IV, 5:179).1 He then distinguishes two ways in which this faculty can be exercised, namely as determining or as reflecting. These two ways are defined as follows: "If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it... is determining. But if merely the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, then judgment is merely reflecting" (ibid.) As Kant goes on to make clear, the Critique of Judgment is particularly concerned with judgment in its capacity as reflecting rather than determining. It is concerned, that is, with how we are to find universals (which he glosses as rules, principles, or laws) for given particulars. Despite the fact that the term "concept" does not appear in this set of definitions, Kant’s discussions of judgment elsewhere make it clear that this faculty can be identified at least in part with our capacity to think particular objects under concepts, in particular empirical concepts.2 The..

What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the basis of reasoning about an arbitrary object. I argue in favor of a more sophisticated constraint on reasoning by universal generalization, one which undermines a rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity.

In what follows I will consider Kant's and Habermas's conceptions of moral validity in a comparative and critical way. First, I will reconstruct Habermas's discursive or deliberative reformulation of Kant's moral theory (sec.1). And, second, I will introduce some comparative critical considerations (2). I will contend that, though much is gained with Habermas's intersubjectivist reformulation of Kant's moral philosophy, some problems emerge that could be treated with the help of certain Kantian insights. I will focus on Kant's and Habermas's strictly moral writings. The issue of political validity or legitimacy (i.e., of the validity of norms that are to be enforced by a coercive state apparatus) is of course of great importance, but I will not address it here.

Contemporary philosophical stances toward `artistic truth' derive from Kant's aesthetics. Whereas philosophers who share Kant's emphasis on aesthetic validity discount art's capacity for truth, philosophers who share Hegel's critique of Kant render artistic truth inaccessible. This essay proposes a critical hermeneutic account of aesthetic validity that supports a non-esoteric notion of artistic truth. Using Gadamer and Adorno to read Kant through Hegelian eyes, I reconstruct the aesthetic dimension from three polarities in modern Western societies. Then I describe aesthetic validity as an horizon of imaginative cogency governing the exploration, presentation and creative interpretation of aesthetic signs. The essay argues that aesthetic processes, so construed, are crucial to cultural pathfinding, and that aesthetic validity-claims in art talk contribute significantly to this pursuit. Aesthetic validity, cultural orientation and art talk constitute the hermeneutical matrix from which questions of artistic truth emerge. Key Words: Theodor W. Adorno • aesthetics • art • Hans-Georg Gadamer • Jürgen Habermas • hermeneutics • imagination • Immanuel Kant • language • validity.

Introduction -- The problem of free harmony -- The doctrine of aesthetic ideas -- Natural and artistic beauty -- Free harmony and aesthetic pleasure -- The extensiveness of the criterion of beauty -- Beauty, free harmony, and moral duty -- Appendix: The meaning of universal validity in Kant's aesthetics -- Postscript: The argument for universal validity.