The veil of perception

Mind 84 (April):210-224 (1975)
Causal accounts of perception are often believed to lead inevitably to the conclusion that we only indirectly perceive things. The paper argues that there are no incompatibilities between accepting causal accounts of perception (e.G., Many scientific explanations of perception) and holding that we directly perceive physical objects, Without the mediation of sense data. Further, There are strong analogical arguments which support the view that talk of causal accounts of perception is consistent with the philosophical position of direct realism
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Idea  Object  Perception
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/LXXXIV.1.210
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Huaping Wang (2011). Disjunctivism and Skepticism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):443-464.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
Hisayasu Kobayashi (2010). Self-Awareness and Mental Perception. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):233-245.
John O. Nelson (1964). An Examination of D M Armstrong's Theory of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (April):154-160.
Frank Jackson (1978). Perception. Philosophical Books 19 (May):49-56.
A. D. Smith (2001). Perception and Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):283-309.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

37 ( #89,182 of 1,725,989 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #289,836 of 1,725,989 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.