Pluralistic ontology and theory reduction in the physical sciences

It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This pluralism is consistent with the unity of nature in the sense of a substantive monism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/39.3.295
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 21,357
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Gordon Belot & John Earman (1997). Chaos Out of Order: Quantum Mechanics, the Correspondence Principle and Chaos. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28 (2):147-182.
Joshua Rosaler (2015). Local Reduction in Physics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 50:54-69.
Stephan Hartmann (2001). Effective Field Theories, Reductionism and Scientific Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 32 (2):267-304.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

205 ( #15,275 of 1,911,325 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

44 ( #14,663 of 1,911,325 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.