Theory coherence and antirealism
| Abstract | Cognitive scientific realism as presented in my previous paper is amended to include a new and strong epistemic indicator for truth of scietific theories: theory coherence and by implication level coherence. Interestingly, this coherence exists despite the incommensurability of the ontology of different levels. Combined with empirical adequacy, theory coherence provides convincing arguments for the confutation of antirealist views. Specifically, fundamentalism, underdetermination, and instrumentalism are considered. | |||||||||
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