Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths

Philosophia 39 (3):547-561 (2011)
That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding to this problem for safety, issuing from work by Williamson and Pritchard, are of dubious success.
Keywords epistemology  anti-luck  safety  senstivity  necessary truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9295-0
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Peter Baumann (2014). No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.

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