A Euthyphronic Problem for Kitcher's Epistemology of Science

Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):205-223 (2009)
Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.
Keywords epistemology of science  Philip Kitcher
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2009.tb00091.x
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Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

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