A Euthyphronic Problem for Kitcher's Epistemology of Science

Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):205-223 (2009)
Abstract
Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.
Keywords epistemology of science  Philip Kitcher
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