Philosophy of Science 61 (1):39-54 (1994)
|Abstract||The basic problem of perceptual change is how to account for both variation and constancy in perceiving the world. Is order learned? How deep does plasticity go in that respect? I argue that different kinds of perceptual plasticity have been confused in recent debates, notably between J. Fodor and P. M. Churchland. By focusing on changes in the use of concepts, the issues in the Fodor-Churchland debate can be resolved. Beyond that debate, I propose a generalized encoding approach to perception as a way of accounting for a significant form of perceptual change|
|Keywords||Change Mechanism Perception Plasticity Science Churchland, P Fodor, J|
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