Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):493-506 (2008)
|Abstract||Philip Kitcher's account of scientific progress incorporates a conception of explanatory unification that invites the so-called 'obsessive unifier' worry, to wit, that in our drive to unify the phenomena we might impose artificial structure on the world and consequently produce an incorrect view of how things, in fact, are. I argue that Kitcher's attempt to address this worry is unsatisfactory because it relies on an ability to choose between rival patterns of explanation which itself rests on the relevant choice having already been made. I also suggest a way of answering the worry that Kitcher is not likely to endorse.|
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