Maddy and mathematics: Naturalism or not

Penelope Maddy advances a purportedly naturalistic account of mathematical methodology which might be taken to answer the question 'What justifies axioms of set theory?' I argue that her account fails both to adequately answer this question and to be naturalistic. Further, the way in which it fails to answer the question deprives it of an analog to one of the chief attractions of naturalism. Naturalism is attractive to naturalists and nonnaturalists alike because it explains the reliability of scientific practice. Maddy's account, on the other hand, appears to be unable to similarly explain the reliability of mathematical practice without violating one of its central tenets
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axm016
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Jeffrey W. Roland (2008). Kitcher and the Obsessive Unifier. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):493-506.

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