David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):79-95 (2011)
The dominant account of agency takes actions to be brought about and guided by intentions that represent the agent's performance of the action. Merleau-Ponty offers an alternative view that denies intentions are essential for action. He holds instead that the agent's activity is brought about by her apprehension of her environment, without the need for any intervening thoughts that represent her performance of it. I argue that two considerations advanced in favour of the thesis that human cognition is embodied are in tension with the dominant account of agency, and speak in favour of Merleau-Ponty's view
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1984). Two Faces of Intention. Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press.
James J. Gibson (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Houghton Mifflin.
Alfred R. Mele (1992). Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. Oxford University Press.
John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
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